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Abstract
In this paper we devise quantitative techniques to analyze the manage-
ment of foreign capital flows in India over the past three decades. The
paper argues that India’s overall approach towards liberalization of
the capital account can be characterized as gradualist and calibrated,
whereby certain agents and flows have been accorded priority in the
liberalization process, from the viewpoint of ensuring financial stabil-
ity. A cross country analysis indicates that the calibrated approach has
resulted in India being ranked towards the lower end of the spectrum
in terms of capital account openness. We analyze the extant regula-
tions governing different types of foreign capital flow, and highlight
the evolution of various types of capital flows over the recent period.
To evaluate Indian macroeconomic management in the face of capital
flows, we quantify the various policy options under the classic prob-
lem of “impossible trinity”. We find that India, like other emerging
markets, has also been confronted with the various alternatives under
”impossible trinity” and has chosen to adopt an intermediate regime,
juggling the objectives of monetary independence, exchange rate sta-
bility, and an open capital account as per the needs of the economy.
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1 Introduction
During the period January 2008 to December 2009, several developing coun-
tries witnessed a sharp increase in volatility of international capital flows.
According to the Institute of International Finance, net private flows to
emerging markets dropped from a high of $1.3 trillion in 2007 to $530 bil-
lion in 2009, and are estimated to rise to $709 billion in 2010. Such sharp
swings in capital flows create a number of problems for a country’s economic
management, and have once again ignited the debate on appropriate extent
of capital account openness. It is widely agreed that the outflow of capital
from emerging markets in 2008 as well as the recent influx into these mar-
kets had very little to do with developments in developing markets. The
initial ’flight to safety’ of international capital from emerging markets was
due to sharp decline in the risk appetite of the global investors in the after-
math of the collapse of financial institutions in the United States. Ironically,
this decline in risk appetite pushed the investors to the park their money
in United States’ treasury bonds, which witnessed an absolute decline in
yields. In contrast, the recent inflow of capital into developing countries is
being perceived to be a fall out of a widening interest rate differential due to
extremely low interest rates prevailing in the industrialized countries. Some
of these flows are likely to see a partial reversal once monetary easing in
industrialized countries is reversed.
This has bought into fore the issue of effective management of the capital
account and the efficacy of the use of capital controls. There are primarily
two major reasons why a country wants to actively manage the capital ac-
count. A key concern of the emerging markets is that unbridled capital flows
can exacerbate financial fragility and lead to a crisis. Large capital flows
are likely to lead to excessive foreign borrowing and hence foreign currency
exposure of the corporate sector. It also manifests itself in domestic credit
booms, especially foreign currency denominated lending and asset bubbles.
A sudden stop of capital flows in such circumstances can have several adverse
consequences. The other concern is associated with macroeconomic man-
agement. It is recognized that a sharp increase in capital flows will cause
an exchange rate appreciation, which will undermine the competitiveness of
the tradebale sector. Alternatively, if the central bank intervenes to prevent
the exchange rate from appreciating, it is likely to lead to an increase in
money supply, fueling inflationary pressures.
As a result of these concerns a number of countries including India, Brazil,
Taiwan, Turkey and Russia nitiated a series of measures in the second half
of 2009 to deter massive inflow of capital entering the country. This is
not the first instance of countries resorting to capital controls. After the
collapse of the Bretton Woods, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a number
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of Latin American and East Asian countries have relied on capital controls
for macroeconomic management.
In this paper, we evaluate the management of capital flows in the Indian
context. India, which started the liberalization of the capital account in
the second half of the 1990s, adopted a calibrated and gradualist approach.
While the capital account has been progressively liberalized, the liberaliza-
tion has not been undertaken in an uniform manner. Certain types of flows
and certain economic agents have been accorded priority in the liberalization
process. The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review
the key issues in the debate on opening up of the capital account. We also
look at the history of capital controls and analyze the efficacy of these con-
trols in various economies. Section 3 evaluates the extent of capital account
openness in India, tracing its evolution during the last three decades as well
as comparing India’s openness with some of the other emerging markets. In
Section 4 we highlight India’s calibrated approach towards capital account
liberalization, and look at the policy regime affecting the different types of
capital flows. Section 5 looks into the issue of macroeconomic management
and articulates how India has managed its exchange rate and monetary pol-
icy regime in the face of increased financial globalization. Finally, Section 6
concludes by summarizing the key points of the paper.
2 A Brief Review of the Existing Literature
The 1980s and 1990s saw a wave of financial liberalization in the emerging
countries in Asia and Latin America with the belief that these capital scarce
countries would benefit from international flows of capital. The proponents
of capital account liberalization like Fischer (1998) and Summers (2000) ar-
gue that free movement of capital has helped a number of developing coun-
tries to raise their per capita incomes, while at the same time increasing
stability in industrialized countries. It is also argued that access to inter-
national finance leads to a reduction in macroeconomic volatility, especially
consumption volatility. By holding claims on foreign countries, agents can
protect themselves against adverse shocks affecting home countries alone.
Despite the theoretical presumption that financial liberalization can have a
positive impact on an economy, the empirical evidence is quite mixed and
depends on the coverage of countries, time frame, choice of the dependent
variable and the measure of capital account openness. Edison et al. (2002)
find that after controlling for the standard determinants of growth, there is
no impact of either the change or the level of capital account liberalization on
economic growth. Arteta et al. (2003) also find that there is a fragile correla-
tion between capital account liberalization and economic growth, although
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the relationship is stronger if one takes into account the extent of trade
openness and rule of law. In a similar vein, Edwards (2001), Klein (2005)
and Bailliu (2000) find a positive effect only after a country has achieved a
certain degree of economic, institutional and financial development.
A number of studies have also looked at the impact of certain components
of capital flows on economic growth. Mody and Murshid (2005) argue that
FDI has a strong positive impact on domestic investment. Bosworth and
Collins (1999) also find that while FDI seems to have a positive impact on
domestic investment, no such impact was discernible in the case of portfolio
investments. In contrast, Quinn et al. find that both FDI and portfolio
equity flows have a significant positive impact on growth.
Kose et al. (2009) argue that despite the scant evidence on direct benefits
of capital account liberalization, there is a body of literature on the indirect
‘collateral benefits’. Levine and Zervos (1998) find that stock market liber-
alization enhances the liquidity of the equity markets. Chinn and Ito (2006)
argue that financial openness leads to equity market development, provided
a moderate level of legal and institutional development has been attained.
Similarly, Klein and Olivei (2008) find that financially integrated economies
have a higher degree of domestic financial sector development. Rajan and
Zingales (2003) argue that financial sector development is countered by in-
cumbents who would be hurt due to the resulting competition, and once
an economy opens up to trade and financial flows, it weakens incumbents’
opposition, and facilitates financial sector development.
Another strand of literature argues that financial openness, raises the cost
of pursuing a destabilizing policy in the form of capital outflow, and therby
induces countries to pursue prudent macroeconomic policies. Gruben and
McLeod (2002) and Sen Gupta (2008) show that financial openness helps
to reduce the incentive to generate inflationary shocks. Kim (2003) finds
evidence that capital account liberalization helps reduce fiscal deficits.
However, the strongest advocates of capital account liberalization recognize
that it can expose the vulnerabilities of a weak domestic financial system.
If capital account liberalization places pressures on weak domestic banks,
and adequate prudential supervision is absent, liberalization can encour-
age individually rational but socially harmful activities such as excessive
risk-taking and “gambling for redemption”, which can culminate in costly
banking crises. Consequently, critics of capital account liberalization like
Rodrik (1998), Bhagwati (1998) and Stiglitz (2000) argue for the imposition
of frictions to limit the international trade in short-term financial assets.
Prasad and Rajan (2008) contend that in an underdeveloped financial sys-
tem, foreign capital is likely to be channeled to easily collateralized non-
tradeable investments like real estate, leading to asset price booms, with
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subsequent busts severely disrupting the economy. Foreign portfolio invest-
ment into shallow equity markets can also cause sharp valuation swings.
A number of studies including Rajan and Subramanian (2005), Johnson
et al. (2007) and Prasad et al. (2007) show that massive unintended capital
inflows could result in rapid real exchange rate appreciation, which can hurt
exports of emerging markets. In some cases even a short-term appreciation
can have lingering implications in the form of permanent loss of export
market share and reductions in manufacturing capacity.
As a result of above outcomes a number of countries have resorted to capital
controls to prevent short term capital flows. However, the efficacy of these
controls has been the subject of debate and the existing literature provides
very diverse conclusions. In one of the most exhaustive surveys on the
efficacy of capital controls, Magud and Reinhart (2007) look at the literature
on imposition of capital controls in Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Czech Republic,
Malaysia and Thailand during the 1990s. They conclude that while capital
controls on inflows allow monetary policy to be more independent, alter the
composition of flows and in some cases alleviate exchange rate pressures,
they are unable to reduce the volume of net flows.
One of the most often cited experiences of capital controls is that of Chile
during the 1990s, wherein it imposed a tax in the form of requiring a certain
percentage of foreign capital inflow to be held with the Central Bank and
not earn any interest (Unremunerated Reserve Ratio). This was done to
slow down the volume of capital inflows, tilt the composition towards longer
maturities, reduce real exchange rate appreciation pressures and maintain
a high interest differential. Studies by Eichengreen (2000) and Eichengreen
and Hausman (1999) conclude that these controls helped to reduce vulner-
ability to external shock, reduce exchange rate volatility and stem currency
appreciation. However, some of the empirical literature argues a more ane-
mic effect of these controls. De Gregorio et al. (2000), Valds-Prieto and
Marcelo (1998) and Edwards (1999) conclude that while Chilean controls
altered the composition of capital flows through a decline in short term
flows and an increase in long term flows, they could not prevent currency
appreciation or provide greater monetary independence.
Columbia, was the other country, which experimented with controls on in-
flows in the form of withholding tax and introduced the URR. While these
controls were not effective in deterring private capital inflows, Cardenas and
Barrera (1997) argue that these controls contributed to the shift away from
debt creating flows towards FDI, which was exempt from controls. However,
it must be noted that imposition of these controls also coincided with other
macroeconomic reforms such as introduction of an exchange rate band, dis-
mantling of interest rate controls. new financing strategy aimed at domestic
financing for the public sector and FDI for the private sector, all of which
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contributed to the reduction in capital flows. Recently, Columbia resorted to
capital controls between 2005 and 2007 in the form of 40% URR on external
borrowings and portfolio inflows, cap of 500% of the overall gross exposure
of each participant in the foreign exchange derivative market, limits on ma-
turity mismatches, limits on open positions of foreign exchanges of financial
intermediaries and limits on the amount of foreign currency pension funds
could hedge. Villar (2010) argues that these measures had a stabilizing effect
during the current crisis
In contrast, Brazilian controls which were aimed at reducing short term cap-
ital inflows, with an emphasis on fixed income securities, had limited success.
Garcia and Valpassos (1998) point out that market participants found ways
to circumvent these controls through financial engineering. They resorted
to other instruments including investments in debentures, government secu-
rities, and derivative products that replicate fixed income returns in their
bid to profit from the large interest rate differential that Brazil provided.
However, studies like Cardoso and Goldfajn (1998) found that capital con-
trols were effective in the short run by changing the composition away from
equity and debt, but did not have a lasting impact.
Malaysia resorted to controls during 1993 and 1994 to curb short term flows
which were seen as exacerbating financial sector risks as well as creating a
discord with the ability to sustain policy of high interest rates, which were
needed to combat inflation. These controls were accompanied with measures
aimed at easing of interest rate policy, curtailment of sterilization operation
and prudential regulations to address the liquidity situation. Malaysia also
resorted to capital controls in 1998 after the Asian Crisis. The success of
these controls is again a subject of debate. Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) find
evidence that these controls allowed Malaysia to segment domestic financial
markets from international financial markets and provided breathing room
for monetary and financial policies and thereby allowed a speedier recovery
than would have been possible if it had gone the IMF route. In contrast,
Hood (2000) argues that the late imposition of the controls and an under-
valued exchange rate meant that in any case there was little incentive for
capital to leave. However, the erosion of confidence due to imposition of
controls might have been reflected in the additional 300 basis points spread
paid on floating rate debt after the controls had been instituted.
Thailand also experimented with the URR in late 2006 and imposed an
URR of 30% on most types of capital flows, barring FDI. It also prohibited
financial institutions from issuing and selling means of exchange in Thailand
to non-residents. Coelho and Gallagher (2010) find that while the URR
reduced the overall level of capital flows, it did not alter the composition of
flows. Moreover, while there was no impact on monetary independence it
resulted in increased exchange rate volatility
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3 Extent of India’s Capital Account Openness
Throughout most of the post Independence period until the early 1980s, In-
dia had a relatively closed capital account. External financing till the 1980s
was primarily confined to external assistance through multilateral and bi-
lateral sources, mostly on concessional terms to or through the government.
This approach was associated with an import substitution strategy due to
export pessimism, and relied on a host of tariffs and quotas to limit the
need for foreign exchange. This scenario started changing since the early
1980s. A widening current account deficit due to higher oil prices, rise in
demand for imports as a result of selective liberalization and a sharp depre-
ciation of the rupee in the second half of the 1980s increased the demand for
external finance. The problem was exacerbated by scheduled repayments
of the Extended Fund Facility withdrawals India had made from the IMF
during the early 1980s. As a result, the traditional sources of financing
had to be supplemented with additional foreign capital and India resorted
to short-term borrowings, external commercial borrowings and deposits by
non-resident Indians (NRI). The final phase of liberalization was under the
overall reform process that was initiated after the balance of payments crisis
in 1991. On the external front, the reforms included dismantling of trade
restrictions, move towards current account convertibility, a market oriented
exchange rate regime and a gradual opening up the capital account.
During the last 20 years, India, has experienced a sharp increase in its
financial integration with the rest of the world. Gross capital flows have
increased nearly 18 times from $43.2 billion in 1991 to over $757.2 billion
in 2008, before declining to $588.2 billion in 2009 as a result of the global
crisis. As a share of GDP, this amounted to an increase from 15.5% in
1991 to 62.8% in 2007 and 47.8% in 2008. This sharp increase in financial
integration is due to a rise in both inflows and outflows. While gross inflows
have increased from $23.3 billion to $395.8 billion between 1991 and 2008,
gross outflow rose from $19 billion to $362 billion. The sharp rise in inflows
and outflows indicate progressive liberalization of the capital account.
As is evident from Figure 1 over the last two decades, India has sustained a
strong capital account surplus, which had grown sharply in the years before
the global financial crisis. The sharp increase in both gross capital inflows
and outflows is a result of progressive liberalization of various aspects of
the capital account as well as India being viewed as a favourable investment
destination. With an impressive economic performance indicated by close to
9% growth rate during 2003 to 2007, prevailing higher domestic interest rates
and a strong currency India’s risk perception was quite low. Furthermore,
this period was also associated with favourable global conditions in the form
of ample liquidity and low interest rates in the global markets.
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Figure 1: Capital Flows in India
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Typically, the extent of capital account liberalization has been determined
using two kinds of measures. The first set of measures look at the de jure
openness, and focus on laws governing the movement of capital in and out of
the country. Most of such measures are based on the IMF’s Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, which provides a
binary evaluation on a number of categories of transactions. Several studies
including Chinn and Ito (2008) and Edwards (2007) have used these scores
to create an index of capital account openness. The second set of measures
focus on de facto openness and look at the actual extent of cross-border
capital flows. Several de facto measures including Lane and Milessi-Ferreti
(2007) and Kose et al. (2008) are available. The two sets of measures can
differ vastly as a country can experience large capital flows despite a closed
capital account due to lack of enforcement, while others may have abolished
capital controls but continue to record low capital flows.
Figure 2 indicates the evolution of capital account openness in India based
on the de jure and de facto measures. The de facto measure, based on Lane
and Milessi-Ferreti (2007) looks at the ratio of the sum of foreign assets
and foreign liabilities to GDP. Typically, it includes portfolio equity, foreign
direct investment, debt and financial derivatives. According to this measure,
India’s capital account openness has increased from 17.8% in 1970 to 85.4%
in 2007. Bulk of this increase in openness has taken place during 2000
to 2007, when the index increased by over 40 percentage points indicating
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Figure 2: Capital Account Openness in India
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a rapid integration of the Indian economy to global capital markets. In
contrast, the de jure openness measure, based on Chinn and Ito (2008),
provides a completely different picture. According to this measure, India’s
extent of openness has remained stagnant since early 1970s. The primary
reason behind this divergence is the evaluation criterion in the AREAER.1
In India, while several controls on inflows and outflows have been eased over
the last three decades the fact that there are still some restrictions explains
the low score. For example, an individual can take money out of India but up
to a limit of $200,000. Similarly, foreign investors are allowed to participate
in corporate debt but up to a limit of $15 billion. Even in the case of FDI,
while across most sectors FDI is allowed, there are some sectoral caps.
A comparison of India’s extent of capital account liberalization with other
emerging markets yields several interesting results. Figure 3 indicates the
decadal average de jure openness of some key emerging market economies. It
is evident that over the last four decades there has been a significant increase
in the extent of capital account openness indicated by the upward shift of
the median line. However, India has failed to keep pace with the liberaliza-
1In the AREAER a score of 0 indicates presence of some restrictions on a particular
transaction, while 1 indicates free movement of capital. Hence according to this measure,
even if a country has progressively liberalized some capital transactions, these transactions
would continue to attract a score of 0 so long there are some minimal restrictions.
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Figure 3: Cross Country Comparison of De Jure Openness
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tion process and consequently has shifted from middle of the distribution of
countries, ranked according to their openness, during the 1970s and 1980s
towards the more restrictive end of spectrum in the last two decades. Again,
as discussed above, one reason for this shift is the partial liberalization of
various flows over the last two decades.
India has also been on the lower end of the spectrum when capital account
openness is measured according to the extent of capital flows. Figure 4
shows that most of the Latin American as well as East Asian countries have
experienced far greater degree of integration on the basis of the Lane and
Milessi-Ferreti measure. Even China, which was lagging behind India in
the 1980s, has overtaken India during the last two decades. The low de
facto and de jure openness can be explained by India’s approach towards
liberalization of the capital account.
4 India’s Approach to Capital Controls
India’s overall management of capital flows can be characterized by its cali-
brated and gradualist approach towards capital account liberalization. With
the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s fresh in mind, India pri-
oritized certain kinds of flows and agents in the liberalization process. In
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Figure 4: Cross Country Comparison of De Facto Openness
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particular, right from the onset of the liberalization process, the need to
shift away from debt to non-debt creating flows, enforce strict regulation of
ECBs, especially the ones with short-term maturity, dissuade volatile flows
from NRIs and a gradual liberalization of outflows, was recognized.
The primary form of non-debt creating flows include equity flows under FDI
and portfolio investment. The policy for FDI inflows has been significantly
liberalized over the past two decades. Currently, barring a few sectors, FDI is
universally allowed. Sectors where FDI is prohibited include atomic energy,
retail trading (excluding single brand retail) and certain agriculture and
plantation activities. In addition, sectors which need an industrial license
(for e.g. alcoholic beverages, defence equipment etc.) or are reserved for
small scale sector are constrained in getting FDI. Some of the sensitive
sectors like insurance, banking etc have sectoral caps. Table 1 provides a
brief outline of the key regulations governing various types of capital inflows.
Figure 5 shows that there has been a sharp increase in FDI inflows in India
since 2003, increasing from $4.5 billion to over $38.4 billion in 2009. Most
of the FDI has been concentrated in the services sectors such as financial
services, telecommunication, real estate, computer software etc. Bulk of the
FDI coming into India, is routed through Mauritius as India has a preferen-
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tial tax treaty with Mauritius. Globally, India’s share in inward FDI among
developing countries has gone up from 1.3% during 1990 to 2000 to 6.7% in
2008.
Figure 5: Foreign Direct Investment Flows
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In recent years, the surge in FDI inflows has been associated with a jump
in outbound FDI resulting from Indian companies acquisition of foreign
companies. In addition, Indian corporates have been inclined to establish
production and distribution networks to access newer technologies and nat-
ural resources. Overall FDI outflow jumped from $2 billion in 2003 to $18.7
billion in 2009. India also increased its share among developing countries in
outward FDI from 0.2% to over 6.0%. This has happened primarily due to
RBI’s easing of restrictions. In Table 2 we indicate the major regulations
influencing capital outflows. In the case of outward FDI, India has again
adopted a gradualist approach and liberalized in an incremental manner.
The relaxation of restrictions on outward FDI was initiated in 1992 with
the introduction of an automatic route for investment up to $4 million. The
RBI could approve proposals up to $15 million with higher proposals requir-
ing an approval from the Ministry of Finance. The upper limit for automatic
approval was raised to $100 million per year. Subsequently, in 2004, firms
were allowed to invest up to 100% of their net worth under the automatic
route, which was raised to 200% in 2005. This limit was increased further
to 300% in June 2007 and finally to 400% in September 2007.
Portfolio investment inflows has also witnessed a strong increase since 2004
and reached a peak of $191.8 billion in 2007 before declining to $137 billion in
2009 in the wake of the global financial crisis. India has been more cautious
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in terms of liberalizing portfolio investment. There are separate investment
caps on sub accounts of FIIs, individual FII and aggregate FII investment
in a company. While NRIs are allowed to invest in Indian companies, they
are also subject to caps at an aggregate and an individual level. Apart from
these constraints, portfolio investors have complete convertibility as they
can bring capital in and out of the country without requiring permissions.
In terms of outward portfolio investment by Indian companies, the limit was
raised from 35% of the net worth to 50% in September 2007. Furthermore,
the aggregate ceiling for overseas investment by mutual funds was also en-
hanced from $4 billion to $5 billion in September 2007, and further to $7
billion in April 2008. Registered venture capital funds are also allowed to
invest in equity and equity-linked instruments of off-shore venture capital
undertakings, up to an aggregate limit of $500 million.
Figure 6: Foreign Portfolio Investment Flows
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As described above, India has been more conservative in terms of liberalizing
debt flows. ECBs are highly regulated with both borrowers and lenders
having to satisfy eligibility criteria with a limit of $500 million per borrower
per financial year under the Automatic Route. Moreover, all ECBs need
to have a maturity of 3 years and in some cases 5 years. There is also a
cap on the all-in-cost payments that a corporate can make.2 Finally, funds
raised through these ECBs can be used to finance only certain activities like
import of capital goods, new projects, modernization/expansion of existing
2All-in-cost includes rate of interest, other fees and expenses in foreign currency except
commitment fee, pre-payment fee, and fees payable in Indian Rupees. Moreover, the
payment of withholding tax in Indian Rupees is excluded for calculating the all-in-cost.
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production units etc. The outflows on account of ECBs are also subject
to certain restrictions, with there being limits on the amount that can be
prepaid. Despite these restrictions, ECB inflows registered a sizeable jump
during the past few years, primarily due to the attractive global interest
rates. Figure 7 shows that ECB inflows have increased from $5 billion in 2003
to over $30 billion in 2007. In contrast ECB outflows have been fluctuating
over the past few years. To encourage outflow of ECBs the RBI enlarged
approved end uses to include overseas direct investment in Joint Ventures
(JV) or Wholly Owned Subsidiaries (WOSs) in February 2004.
Figure 7: External Commercial Borrowing Flows
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Foreign investment in government securities, treasury bills and corporate
debt is also heavily regulated. Only NRIs and FIIs registered with SEBI can
invest in these instruments. Earlier there was a cap on the share of total of
investment funds that could be devoted to debt instruments. However, this
was relaxed in 2008 in the wake of the crisis. Further there is cap on the
amount FIIs can invest in corporate and government bonds, although these
limits have been raised significantly over the past few years. Currently, the
limit on corporate debt stands at $15 million while the limit on government
debt is $5 billion. Moreover, they can also invest in innovative instruments
such as Upper Tier-II capital up to a limit of $500 million.
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5 India’s Tryst with the Impossible Trinity
In Section 1 we pointed out two main reasons for wanting to control the
flow of capital. Volatile capital tends to exacerbate the fragility of the fi-
nancial sector. Moreover, it can create complications for the macroeconomic
management of the economy. This is related to the concept of “impossible
trinity”, propounded originally in Mundell (1961) and Mundell (1968), and
states that it is not simultaneously possible to have free capital flows, an
independent monetary policy and a fixed exchange rate. Only two of the
three objectives can be obtained at a particular point in time. For example,
a country can obtain a stable exchange rate regime with an open capital
account by giving up monetary independence. The monetary authority can
no longer independently vary the domestic interest rate, which will have to
follow the foreign interest rate. Alternatively, a country can retain monetary
independence and an open capital account but will have to forgo exchange
rate stability. Exchange rate movement will be dictated by the interest rate
differential and quantum of international capital flows. Finally, the impo-
sition of capital controls breaks the link between the interest rate and the
exchange rate and allows a country to retain exchange rate stability with
monetary independence. A number of countries including India, Brazil, Tai-
wan, Turkey and Russia have initiated a series of measures to deter massive
inflow of capital entering the country.
As shown in Figure 2 there has been a rapid increase in India’s integra-
tion with the global economy since the mid 1990s. Prior to that India’s
extent of capital account openness was extremely low and hence there was
no dichotomy between stabilizing the exchange rate and retaining monetary
independence. It is mainly in recent years where India has been forced to
juggle the various conflicting objectives. To look further into this issue one
would need to quantify the various objectives of the “impossible trinity”.
We do this, largely, following the methodology outlined in Aizenman et al.
(2010) and cover the period 1980 to 2007.3
Monetary Independence
We measure the extent of monetary independence as the inverse of the an-
nual correlation of the monthly interest rates between India and the United
States. The United States is taken as the base country following Aizenman
et al. (2010) and Shambaugh (2004) who argue that Indian monetary policy
through this period was most closely linked to the United States. We use
the money market rates for the interest rates. In India, the Reserve Bank
of India (RBI) uses a number of monetary policy tools like the repo rate,
reverse repo rate, reserve ratio etc. Changes in any of these are going to
3The period coverage is limited by the availability of the measure of capital account
openness.
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have an impact on the money market rate. Following Aizenman et al. (2010)
the index for extent of monetary independence is given by
MI = 1− corr(i, i
∗)− (−1)
1− (−1) (1)
where i refers to the Indian money market rate and i∗ indicates the US
money market rate. This index can take a maximum value of 1 and a
minimum value of 0. By construction a higher value of the index implies
greater monetary independence. While data on Indian money market rates
are taken from the Reserve Bank of India, data on United States’ rates are
obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS).
Exchange Rate Rigidity
The index for Exchange Rate Rigidity is calculated using the annual stan-
dard deviations of the monthly exchange rate between India and the United
States.
ERR =
0.01
0.01 + σ(∆())
(2)
where σ indicates the standard deviation and ∆ is the first difference oper-
ator and  is log of the bilateral exchange rate between the Indian Rupee
and the US Dollar. Again, the way the index is created it will lie between 0
and 1 with a higher number indicating a more rigid exchange rate regime.
Capital Account Openness
In construction of the capital account openness index we deviate from Aizen-
man et al. (2010), who use a de jure measure to analyze the extent of open-
ness. As discussed above, for India, this might not be the most appropriate
measure of openness as according to it India’s extent of openness remained
virtually unchanged since the 1970s. Moreover, we think that it is the actual
quantum of flows that creates a conflict between monetary independence and
exchange rate rigidity and not the regulations. A country with a high de
jure openness can have low inflow of capital and hence not be worried about
not being able to simultaneously stabilize exchange rate and retain mone-
tary autonomy. On the other hand, a country with low de jure openness can
experience a large flows due to low enforcement of capital controls, and be
concerned about ensuring monetary independence and exchange rate stabil-
ity. Thus de facto measures seem conceptually more appropriate if one is
interested in the effects of an outcome based measure of financial integration.
As a result we use the de facto measure outlined in Lane and Milessi-Ferreti
(2007) where capital account openness is described as the ratio of the sum
of foreign assets (FA) and liabilities (FL) to GDP. To make this measure
comparable with the others we normalize it to lie between 0 and 1.
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KO =
FA+ FL
GDP
(3)
Table 5 provides the main summary statistics for the three conflicting policy
objectives. As can be seen there has been a wide range of variation on all
the three indices during the 28 year period under study.
Key Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Monetary Independence 28 0.449 0.161 0.095 0.706
Exchange Rate Rigidity 28 0.575 0.235 0.158 1
Capital Account Openness 28 0.176 0.217 0 1
Before going further, one needs to analyze whether major domestic and
international events have been associated with structural breaks in the index
series. Two key important events that might have influenced the policy
choices of the authorities are the economic reforms initiated after the 1991
crisis and the contagion from the East Asian crisis in 1997. To exclude the
impact of the crisis we leave out the crisis year and the subsequent year.
The first and second columns of Table 5 show that the mean for monetary
independence declined significantly after India initiated its reform process
in 1991. In contrast, the mean for capital account openness was nearly three
times higher in the post reform period compared to the pre-reform period.
We get similar results when we consider a structural break due to the Asian
crisis. In fact the decline in monetary independence and increase in capital
account openness is stronger in this case. In both cases there is an increase
in the mean of exchange rate rigidity, but the difference is not significant.
Key Summary Statistics
1980-90 1993-2007 1980-1996 1999-2007
Monetary Independence 0.584 0.361 0.535 0.271
Difference 0.223 0.263
t stat 4.361 5.962
Exchange Rate Rigidity 0.517 0.590 0.548 0.580
Difference -0.070 -0.032
t stat -0.980 -0.391
Capital Account Openness 0.080 0.252 0.091 0.361
Difference -0.172 -0.270
t stat -2.027 -3.544
A comparison of the evolution of these indices over time indicates the devel-
opment of the payments regime in India. To do this we resort to ‘diamond
charts’ where we measure monetary independence, exchange rate rigidity
and capital account openness on the three vertices. On the fourth vertex we
measure the extent of accumulation of international reserves (as a share of
GDP).4 To make it comparable with the other measures we normalize this
measure to lie between 0 and 1. The origin in these diamond charts indicate
4From 1997 onwards the measure is based on the actual intervention by the RBI to
exclude valuation changes. However, for the period before 1997, due to data constraints
the reserve accumulation includes valuation changes.
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completely floating exchange rate, zero monetary independence, completely
closed capital account and zero international reserves accumulation. Figure
8 highlights the trend for these measures for India during 1980 to 2007.
As is evident from Figure 8(a) and 8(b), during the 1980s there was limited
amount of international capital movement with the normalized KO index
fluctuating between 0 and 0.19. As a result the policymakers were able
to retain both monetary independence and exchange rate stability. While
the index of monetary independence varied between 0.5 and 0.71 with an
average value of 0.58, the one for exchange rate stability fluctuated between
0.33 and 0.69 with an average value of 0.51.
In the late 1980s India’s macroeconomic health began to deteriorate signif-
icantly. With a reorientation of its development strategy towards greater
exports several measures were introduced to promote exports and liberalize
imports for exporters. The relaxation of controls led to a surge in imports
which were exacerbated by a sharp increase in import of petroleum prod-
ucts as domestic petroleum production slowed down. The situation worsened
with the Gulf crisis, which led to a sharp spike in oil prices, and economic
deterioration in Middle East and erstwhile Soviet Union, leading to a col-
lapse of India’s major export markets. The current account deficit widened
from 0.9% of GDP in 1983-1984 to 2.33% in 1989-90.5 As the current ac-
count deficit became higher than funds available through aid financing, the
government relaxed some of the capital controls. Consequently, the cur-
rent account deficit started being financed by non-resident remittances and
borrowings at commercial terms. Thus within a short span, there was a
significant increase in the reliance on high-cost short-term financing.
Cerra and Saxena (2002) show that medium and long-term debts more than
quadrupled and stood at $13 billion in 1990-91 compared to only $3 billion
in 1984-85. Short-term external debt increased by $6 billion during this pe-
riod compared to reserve holdings of only $2 billion, and the ratio of debt
service payments to current receipts widened to nearly 30%. When the crisis
broke out there was a net outflow of non-resident deposits and reluctance to
roll-over short-term debt. The crisis was resolved by a combination of deval-
uation, deflation and borrowing from the IMF. Along with the stabilization
effort, there was a concerted moved towards a path of economic reform.
5The Indian fiscal year runs from 1st April to 31st March.
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During the period 1993 to 1995, India witnessed its first surge of capital
inflows. As Joshi (2003) argues the surge in capital flows was assisted by
pull factor including newer profit opportunities arising due to the economic
reforms and the push factor of lower global interest rates. FII inflows in-
creased more than seven times from $307 million in July to September 1993
to $2.3 billion during January to March 1994. Net capital inflow of over
$9 billion during 1993− 94 and 1994− 95 was three times that of previous
years. As a result of these flows, the policymakers were faced with a choice
of either allowing nominal exchange rate to appreciate, thereby giving up
exchange rate stability or fixing the exchange rate and allowing the money
supply to change, thereby relinquishing monetary independence. The Indian
authorities chose to give up monetary independence in favour of exchange
rate stability. In fact, the exchange rate remained steady at Rs. 31.4 per
dollar from April 1993 to August 1995. This leads to an ERR index of close
to one for the years 1993, 1994 and 1995. India’s reserve holdings more than
doubled from less than $12 billion in July 1993 to $24 billion in October
1994. This is also reflected in the index for reserve accumulation, which
jumped from being in range of 0 to 0.16 in the 1980s to 0.28 and 0.43 in
1993 and 1994, respectively. Due to paucity of instruments and an illiquid
bond market, the RBI could not sterilize these foreign inflows and there was
a sharp increase in money supply. Consequently, the money supply growth
rate surged to 20 percent in late 1994 and contributed to a rapid rise in
inflation. The loss of monetary independence is reflected in Figure 8(c) with
a drop in the index to 0.35 in 1993 and 0.44 in 1994 from an average of 0.58
in the 1980s.
In the second half of the 1990s there was a reversal in the situation as a
number of international events put a downward pressure on the exchange
rate. The reforms of the early 1990s started having an impact and the
Indian economy moved from an average rate of growth of 5.3% during 1980
to 1994 to grow at 6.4%, 7.3% and 8.0% in the next three years. However,
this was associated with a rise in current account deficit as there was an
increase in demand for imports. Simultaneously, the Mexican crisis in 1995
resulted in a reduction in capital inflows indicated by a drop in the capital
account openness index to 0.07 in 1995 and 0.18 in 1996. The authorities
allowed a moderate depreciation of the Rupee leading to a decline in the
exchange rate rigidity index, which stood at 0.31 and 0.37 in 1995 and 1996.
Flexibility in the exchange rate regime allowed the authorities to reassert
monetary independence, which rose to 0.59 in 1996.
During 1997 to 2001 India continue to experience limited capital inflows due
to a number of domestic and external factors. In 1997 and 1998 inflow of
foreign capital into India was adversely affected following contagion from
countries in East Asia and Latin America, which were impacted by a series
of financial crisis. The inflow of capital was also affected due to economic
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sanctions imposed on India after it had conducted nuclear tests in May 1998.
Furthermore, this was also a period of political instability as the country
faced three general elections and four prime ministers between 1996 and
1999. Finally, in the developed countries there was a decline in economic
activity due to the bursting of the dotcom bubble. As a result of these
factors, net capital inflows, which were around $12 billion in 1996 continued
to decline over the next few years, and managed to exceed this level only in
2003. The reduction in capital flows is also described by a drop in the capital
account openness index in this period, which as can be seen in Figures 8(d)
and 8(e) stayed within the range of to 0.06 and 0.22 between 1997 and 2002.
The decline in capital flows resulted in a moderate depreciation of the Indian
Rupee, with the exchange rate rigidity index dropping to 0.37 and 0.38 in
1997 and 1998. Over the next few years, the RBI tried to maintain a stable
real effective exchange rate by inducing a modest depreciation against the US
Dollar to offset the inflation differential. This gets reflected in the exchange
rate rigidity index, which remained in a range between 0.6 and 0.75.
The various policy trade-offs under the impossible trinity got exacerbated
since 2003 due to a surge in capital inflows. Net capital inflows increased
from around $10 billion in 1999 and 2000 to $16 billion in 2003 and further
to $22 billion in 2004. Consequently, the capital account openness index rose
to 0.42 and 0.38 in 2003 and 2004. To prevent the Rupee from appreciating
rapidly, the RBI heavily intervened in the foreign exchange market. Figures
9(a) and 9(b) indicate that between January 2001 and April 2004, the RBI
purchased more $62 billion of foreign exchange. To prevent this intervention
from leading to a sharp increase in monetary base, the RBI resorted to
sterilization. It reduced its holding of government bonds and its stock of
net domestic assets declined from Rs. 1.9 trillion in April 2001 to Rs. 0.19
trillion in April 2004. Thus as can be seen in Figure 9(c) in the early part
of 2000s the increase in net foreign assets was matched by a decline in net
domestic assets, and the growth in reserve money was relatively stable. The
successful sterilization during this period meant that the RBI managed to
have a stable exchange rate against the US Dollar. Thus throughout 2001
to 2003 the exchange rate rigidity index takes a value of 0.70.
Towards late 2003, the RBI started to run out of government bonds for ster-
ilization, and in January 2004, a new instrument for sterilization - Market
Stabilization Scheme (MSS) bonds - was introduced. The RBI sold these
MSS bonds on the behalf of the government to sterilize the impact of capital
inflows. By August 2005, the amount of outstanding MSS bonds increased
to Rs. 0.71 trillion. However, with a rising amount of outstanding MSS
bonds, the fiscal cost of sterilization became a worrisome issue.6
scal cost since the interest rate on these sterilization bonds tend to be higher
than that earned on foreign assets. Consequently, the RBI resorted to in-
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complete sterilization of the capital flows, which led to an increase in the
growth rate of reserve money. In addition, it reduced its intervention in
the foreign exchange market, which led to the Rupee appreciating by 6.5%
between August 2004 and July 2005. As a result, the exchange rate rigidity
index dropped to 0.4 and 0.53 in 2004 and 2005, respectively (Figure 8(f)).
Figure 9: Reserve Accumulation and Sterilization
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In 2006 and 2007, the surge in capital flow accelerated and the capital ac-
count registered a surplus of $38 billion and $94.3 billion, respectively. Bulk
of this amount came in the form of portfolio investment in the Indian equity
market, commercial borrowing by the private sector and short term credit to
India. This resulted in the BSE Sensex increasing by 43% in 2006 and 47%
in 2007 and external debt increasing from $132 billion in end 2005 to $160
billion by end of 2006 and further to $206 billion in 2007. The RBI tried
to achieve an intermediate regime in an attempt to manage the impossible
trinity. It introduced a number of measures in 2007 to limit capital flows.
These included imposing restrictions on ECBs in August 2007 by allowing
ECBs of over $20 million only if the expenditure was to be done in foreign
currency, and the funds could not be remitted to India. In the case of ECBs
less than $20 million, funds could be raised for Rupee expenditure, but the
funds would have to be parked overseas until actual requirement in India.
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Furthermore, in October 2007, the Securities and Exchange Board of India
(SEBI) restricted the use of Participatory Notes (PNs) by imposing ceilings
on PNs and restrictions on FIIs.7 In December 2007, the RBI introduced
measures to limit loans to both foreign and domestically held mutual funds
operating in India. The measures included considering these loans as direct
investments in stock and bond instruments in the calculation of a banks
capital adequacy ratio, and by restricting banks investment in stocks and
bonds to 40% of its net worth. However, none of these measures were very
effective as capital continued to pour in to the country.
In an attempt to retain some degree of monetary independence, fresh MSS
bonds were issued to sterilize the foreign exchange purchases, despite the
growing fiscal cost. The outstanding stock of MSS bonds increased by Rs.
1.4 trillion between January and December 2007. Despite this sharp increase
in issuance of MSS bonds, the RBI was not able to completely sterilize the
foreign inflows as the RBI purchased over $75 billion or about Rs. 3.0 trillion
during this period. To suck in some of this liquidity that was being injected,
the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) was raised by 200 basis points during 2007
(Figure 9(d)).
Finally, the Rupee was allowed to appreciate significantly over this period.
While the Rupee appreciated against the Dollar by 12% over this period, the
trade weighted REER appreciated by 5%. Such a rapid rate of appreciation
was unprecedented in the post liberalization era.
With the outbreak of the sub-prime crisis in the United States and the ‘flight
to safety’ of foreign capital from emerging markets, capital started owing out
of the Indian economy late 2007, which continued till early 2009. Capital
flow to emerging markets resumed in early 2009, with India receiving net
capital inflows of $43 billion during April to December 2009, compared to
only $5.8 billion in 2008. This resurgence in capital flow has once again
forced India to make some tough policy choices.
The RBI has tried to curb the inflow of capital by introducing certain restric-
tions. The all-in-cost ceilings, which were withdrawn in January 2009, to
encourage ECBs, were reimposed in December 2009. In fact the reimposed
ceilings were higher by 100 to 150 basis points from the pre-crisis levels.
In addition, foreign currency convertible buybacks were discontinued. The
Rupee was also allowed to appreciate in the face of strong capital flows. It
appreciated by nearly 17.5% between March 2009 and April 2010. Even, the
36 currency NEER appreciated by more than 9.3%.
Interestingly, the RBI has refrained from intervening in the foreign exchange
market to mitigate the pressures of appreciation. Between March 2009 and
7Participatory Notes are instruments used by investors or hedge funds, which are are
not registered with SEBI to invest in Indian equity market.
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November 2009, the RBI actually sold more than $6 billion of reserves. Re-
luctance to intervene and sterilize can be attributed to RBI’s preoccupation
to manage record borrowing requirements of the government in 2009 − 10
and 2010−11. Sterilization of inflows can result in driving the interest rates
up, which will have negative consequences for government borrowing. Fur-
thermore, incomplete sterilization of the inflows would increase the money
supply and exacerbate inflationary pressure, which the RBI is keen to pre-
vent with inflation crossing 10% in March 2010. Finally, a strong currency is
going to help moderate inflation by reducing the cost of importables. How-
ever, RBI has left the option of sterilization in the future open by agreeing
to replenish the MSS bonds to the tune of Rs. 500 billion. A further increase
in inflows may be countered by the use of these bonds.
6 Conclusion
There is now an emerging consensus that countries need to actively man-
age their capital account to avoid vulnerabilities associated with financial
crisis. While it is widely agreed that capital flows aid growth by providing
external capital to sustain an excess of investment over domestic savings, in
recent years, many emerging markets, including India, have received capital
flows that are far greater than their current account financing requirements
creating macroeconomic management challenges. In such cases, excess cap-
ital flows tends to feed into real exchange rate misalignment, excesses in
credit market, asset price booms, building up of inflationary pressure and
overall financial fragility. This brings in the need to actively manage capital
flows. While capital controls can be effective they are generally not fool-
proof, and are vulnerable to leakages through financial engineering. In such
circumstances, a gamut of policy measures has to be used to ensure finan-
cial stability of the economy. These would include exchange rate flexibility,
holding of adequate reserves, intervention in the foreign exchange market,
and overall development of the financial sector.
India has also resorted to the multiple instrument approach while dealing
with capital flows. The overall policy architecture encompassed active man-
agement of capital flows, especially volatile and debt flows; a moderately
flexible exchange rate regime with the RBI intervening at times to prevent
excessive volatility; sterilization of these interventions through multiple in-
struments like MSS bonds and CRR; and building up of a stockpile of re-
serves. This approach has suited India well as it has been able to maintain
a healthy growth rate, targeted monetary and credit growth rate, moderate
inflation rate through most of the period and a sustainable current account
deficit.
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